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AN EFFICIENT ALGORITHM FOR NUCLEOLUS AND
PREKERNEL COMPUTATION IN SOME CLASSES OF
TU-GAMES
ULRICH FAIGLE, WALTER KERN, AND JEROEN KUIPERS
Abstract. We consider classes of TU-games. We show that we can
eciently compute an allocation in the intersection of the prekernel and
the least core of the game if we can eciently compute the minimum
excess for any given allocation. In the case where the prekernel of the
game contains exactly one core vector, our algorithm computes the nu-
cleolus of the game. This generalizes both a recent result by Kuipers
on the computation of the nucleolus for convex games and a classical
result by Megiddo on the nucleolus of standard tree games to classes
of more general minimum cost spanning tree games. Our algorithm is
based on the ellipsoid method and Maschler’s scheme for approximating
the prekernel.
1. Introduction
Recent years have seen an increased interest in computational complex-
ity aspects of solution concepts in cooperative game theory (see, e:g:, Deng
and Papadimitriou [1994] or Deng et al. [1997]). On the positive side, ef-
cient algorithms have been developed, e:g:, for the computation of the
nucleolus of assignment games (Solymosi and Raghavan [1994], the nucleon
of matching games (Faigle et al. [1996]), the nucleolus of convex games
(Kuipers [1997]), and the nucleolus of standard tree games (Megiddo [1987],
Granot et al. [1996]). On the negative side, several NP -hardness results
were obtained, e:g:, for testing core membership (Faigle et al. [1997a]) or
computing the nucleolus for min cost spanning tree games (MCST-games)
(Faigle et al. [1997b]).
In the present paper, we investigate the computational complexity of com-
puting an element in the prekernel of a game. This investigation is motivated
by the observation that the prenucleolus of a game lies in the prekernel (cf:
Schmeidler [1969]). In fact, we propose an algorithm for the the computa-
tion of a prekernel element that will actually produce the nucleolus for many
classes of games.
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Our algorithm makes heavy use of the ellipsoid method (implying that
the eciency of our algorithm is of a more theoretical kind). Since the pre-
kernel of a cooperative game is typically non-convex, it might be somewhat
surprising that the ellipsoid method should be successful at all. We over-
come this diculty with the help of an approximating scheme that Maschler
suggested for nding (pre-)kernel elements: we perform only a few steps of
Maschler’s scheme in order to nd a suitable cutting plane.
2. Basic Definitions and Computational Assumptions
We start by recalling some well-known notions from the theory of coop-
erative games.
A transferable utility (TU-) game is described by a pair (N; c), where N is
a nite set of n players and c : 2N ! R is a cost function satisfying c(;) = 0.
A coalition is a subset S  N and c(S) is called the cost of coalition S with
the interpretation that c(S) is the joint cost of the players in S if they decide
to cooperate.
A vector x 2 RN is an allocation (or preimputation) if x(N) = c(N): (We
will use the shorthand notation x(S) =
P
i2S
xi throughout in this paper).
The allocation x is called an imputation if xi  c(fig) holds for all i 2 N .
Given an allocation x 2 RN , the excess of a coalition S (with respect to
x) is dened as the number
e(S; x) := c(S)− x(S) :
Setting emin(x) := minfe(S; x) j ; 6= S 6= Ng, we arrive at the core of the
game (N; c) as the set core(c) of all allocations whose excesses are non-
negative, i:e:,
core(c) := fx 2 RN jx(N) = c(N) ; emin(x)  0g :
Because the core of a game may be empty, it is useful to relax the notion of
the core. Let
(c) := maxfemin(x) jx 2 RN ; x(N) = c(N)g
and dene the least core as the set leastcore(c) of those allocations whose
non-trivial excesses are at least (c), i:e:,
leastcore(c) := fx 2 RN jx(N) = c(N); emin(x)  (c)g :
Note that leastcore(c) is always non-empty. Moreover, leastcore(c)  core(c)
holds whenever core(c) is non-empty.
Another optimality property with respect to the excesses of an allocation
gives rise to the nucleolus of a cooperative game in the following way. Given
an allocation x 2 RN for the game (N; c), let (x) denote the (2jN j − 2)-
dimensional vector of all non-trivial excesses e(S; x); ; 6= S 6= N , arranged
in non-decreasing order. The prenucleolus (c) is then dened to be the
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(unique) allocation x 2 RN that lexicographically maximizes  over the set
of all allocations. We obtain the nucleolus when we compute the lexico-
graphic maximum over the subset of all imputations.
It follows immediately from the denition that (c) always exists and is
a member of the least core leastcore(c). Moreover, the prenucleolus and the
nucleolus coincide whenever core(c) is non-empty.
We now come to the central game theoretic solution concept for our cur-
rent investigation. Given an allocation x and a pair (i; j) of players, we
dene the surplus of player i 2 N against player j 2 N as the number
sij(x) := minfe(S; x) j S  N; i 2 S; j =2 Sg:
The prekernel of the game (N; c) is the set K(c) of allocations x for which
the surplusses are symmetric, i:e:,
K(c) := fx 2 RN j x(N) = c(N); sij(x) = sji(x) 8i; jg:
The kernel K(c) of the game N; c) is a related solution concept and is dened
as the set of all imputations x 2 RN satisfying the following condition for
every pair (i; j) of players:
sij(x) < sji(x) implies xj = c(fjg) :
It is generally agreed that the notion of (pre-)kernel is not very intuitive in
its own right. Yet, it has received considerable attention because it exhibits
quite interesting (and useful) relationships with other solution concepts (see
also Section 4 below). For example, one can prove that the prenucleolus is
always in the prekernel (cf: Schmeidler [1969]). On the other hand, we have
seen that the (pre)nucleolus is in the core whenever the core is non-empty.
Hence we conclude
Theorem 2.1. If core(c) \ K(c) contains just one single point x 2 RN ,
then x is the nucleolus.

There are several important classes of games to which Theorem 2.1 ap-
plies: for example, the class of convex games (cf: Maschler et al. [1972]) and
the class of minimum cost spanning tree (MCST) games (cf: Granot and
Huberman [1984]). (In the case of convex games, even the prekernel con-
sists of only one point; the prekernel of MCST-games may contain several
points, but only one of them is in the core).
It therefore seems desirable to have ecient algorithms available that
compute elements in K(c) or in K(c)\core(c). Our main result states that,
provided we can eciently compute all surplusses sij(x) for any allocation
x, we can also eciently compute an element x 2 K(c). Moreover, the
allocation x we compute will be in core(c) whenever core(c) 6= ;. To be
more precise: the allocation x we compute will always be a member of the
least core of the game (N; c).
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Intuitively, it seems inevitable that one should at least be able to compute
the sij(x)’s if one wants to check whether a given vector x 2 RN is a member
of the prekernel K(c). In that sense, our result would be about the best
one can hope for.
Before proceeding further, however, we want to make the notion of (algo-
rithmically) \ecient" (\polynomial time") more precise and describe our
computational model in more detail.
We consider a class C of cooperative games. Each game (N; c) 2 C is
assumed to have a rational cost function c and will be given to us by
(C1) The nite set N of players.
(C2) An upper bound < c > on the maximum (input) size (i:e:, encoding
length)
max
SN
< c(S) > :
(C3) An algorithm (\oracle"), which, on input S  N , computes and out-
puts the value c(S) 2 Q.
(As is usual, we take the encoding length < q > of a rational number
q 2 Q as the number of bits needed for its binary representation (see, e:g:,
Gro¨tschel et al. [1993] for more details)).
In the following, we consider algorithms for the class C. An algorithm
A for C is given as input a game (N; c) 2 C (i:e:, the player set N , the
upper bound < c > on the encoding length of the c-values, and access to
the oracle for the values c(S)) and possibly some \additional" input x of
encoding length < x >. The running time of A is measured in terms of the
number of \elementary operations" (bit operations) and calls to the oracle
for the c-values.
We say that the algorithm A is polynomial time or ecient if there exists
a polynomial pA such that, on input (N; c) and x, A performs at most
pA(jN j; < c >;< x >) elementary operations and calls to the oracle.
Let, for example, C be the class of MCST-games (see also Section 7).
Then the cost function c of a game (N; c) 2 C is dened implicitly by a
graph on jN j + 1 nodes and edge weights wij. The maximum size of the
c-values will be bounded by a polynomial in jN j and < w >:= max < wij >
(because each c(S) is the sum of the edge weights in the underlying graph).
Thus a polynomial time algorithm for the class of MCST-games, in the
sense above, is an algorithm A which, on input (N; c) and x, performs poly-
nomially (in jN j, < w >, and < x >) many elementary operations and calls
to the oracle for (N; c). Note the oracle may in the present example be
replaced by any minimum spanning tree algorithm that computes the value
c(S) in polynomial time (relative to jN j and < w >). Hence a polynomial
time algorithm for the class of MCST-games in this abstract setting is just
a polynomial time algorithm in the usual sense (with running time bounded
by poly(jN j; < w >;< x >).
COMPUTATION OF THE NUCLEOLUS 5
Let us now return to the extra assumption we need to guarantee that
our computations will be polynomial. First of all, recall that without any
further assumption the problem of computing an element in K, even if this
set consists of only one point, is NP -hard. This follows, e:g:, from Faigle
et al. [1997b]. To see what assumption we minimally would like to hold,
let us consider the seemingly simpler problem of checking whether a given
allocation x is an element of K(c) \ core(c). This amounts to verifying the
following equations and inequalities:
(2:1) x(S)  c(S) (S  N)
(2:2) sij(x) = sji(x) (i; j 2 N)
As mentioned above, it seems reasonable that, in order to check (2:2)
eciently, we should at least be able to eciently compute all sij(x), given
x: This is exactly the computational extra assumption relative to the class
C we make:
Assumption (CCS):
There exists a polynomial algorithm A which, for every given game (N; c) 2
C, allocation x 2 RN , and players i; j 2 N , computes the number sij(x).
Here we implicitly assume, of course, that the input vectors x in assump-
tion (CCS) are rational and hence < x > is well-dened.
Note that (CCS) also allows us to check whether the system of inequalities
(2.1) above it satised, since
min
;6=S 6=N
e(S; x) = min
i;j
sij(x) :
Indeed, the \converse" is also true, i:e:, (CCS) is equivalent to the follow-
ing assumption on the computational complexity of the minimal excess:
Assumption (CCM):
There exists an polynomial algorithm A0 which, for every given (N; c) 2 C
and allocation x 2 RN , computes
emin(x) = min;6=S 6=N
e(S; x) :
To prove the equivalence, we have to show that (CCM) implies (CCS).
Thus assume A0 is an algorithm as implied by (CCM). Let x 2 RN be an
allocation and i; j 2 N: LetK := 21+<c>+<x> (so that K  2(jc(S)j+jx(S)j)
for all S  N), and dene the allocation x by
xm =
8<: xi +K if m = ixj −K if m = j
xm else.
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Use A0 to compute emin(x). If S  N is a set whose excess attains this
minimum, then, obviously, i 2 S and j =2 S: Hence eminx = sij(x): But
sij(x) = sij(x) +K;, which establishes the claim.
Still assuming (CCS) or (CCM), it is important to see that a similar
construction allows us to actually compute in polynomial time coalitions
S  N with emin(x) = e(S; x) and Sij  N with i 2 Sij, j =2 Sij , and
sij = e(Sij ; x). We illustrate the algorithmic idea for emin(x).
For all i; j 2 N , dene the allocation x(i;j) by
x(i;j)m =
8<: xi + 1 if m = ixj − 1 if m = j
xm else.
Then we obtain for each S  N ,
e(S; x(i;j)) =
8<: e(S; x) − 1 if i 2 S; j =2 Se(S; x) + 1 if j 2 S; i =2 S
e(S; x) else.
Let i1; j1 2 N now be such that emin(x(i1;j1)) < emin(x), then emin(x(i1;j1)) =
emin(x)−1, and each ; 6= S 6= N with emin(x(i1;j1)) = e(S; x(i1;j1)) necessar-
ily satises i1 2 S, j1 =2 S, and emin(x) = e(S; x). Assume, we have found
such a pair (i1; j1) of players and set x1 := x(i1;j1).
We try to nd a pair (i2; j2) of players with j2 2 Nnfj1g and emin(x(i2;j2)1 ) <
emin(x1). If this turns out to be impossible, then N n fj1g apparently must
satisfy emin(x1) = e(N n fj1g; x1) and hence
emin(x) = e(N n fj1g; x) :
Otherwise, each ; 6= S 6= N with emin(x(i2;j2)1 ) = e(S; x(i2;j2)1 ) necessarily
satises S  N n fj1; j2g. So we can repeat the procedure with x2 := x(i2;j2)1
in order to nd a pair (i3; j3) with j3 2 N n fj1; j2g etc:. It is clear that this
procedure halts after k < jN j iterations, and we will have found a nonempty
coalition S = N n fj1; : : : ; jkg such that
emin(x) = e(S; x) :
We have seen that if we assume (CCS) - or, equivalently, (CCM) - we
can eciently check whether a given allocation x is in K(c) \ core(c). The
task of actually computing such an element x in K(c) \ core(c), however,
appears to be more dicult. Our approach to such a computation will be
based on a scheme for approximating the prekernel, which was proposed by
Maschler at the 1965 Jerusalem Conference on Game Theory, convergence
of which was proved later by Stearns (cf: Stearns [1968]).
However, as Stearns points out, \there are some undesirable properties
of this method regarding the speed of convergence and knowing when one
is close to K(c)". We try to overcome this diculty by performing only a
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few steps of Maschler’s algorithmic scheme and use the outcome to generate
separating hyperplanes for the ellipsoid method.
The presentation of the results in our paper is now as follows. In Section 3,
we review the relevant results concerning the ellipsoid method. In Section 4,
we discuss Maschler’s approximation scheme. We describe our algorithm in
Section 5. Some applications of our results are given afterwards.
3. The ellipsoid method
The ellipsoid method, as presented by Khachiyan [1979], was a major
breakthrough in the theory of computational complexity, implying that lin-
ear programming problems can be solved in polynomial time. Subsequently,
this algorithmic tool was sharpened by Gro¨tschel, Lovasz and Schrijver to
show that, roughly speaking, the problems of separation and optimization
over a convex body K are computationally equivalent in the sense that one
can optimize a linear function over K eciently, provided one can eciently
nd, for any given x =2 K, a separating hyperplane, i:e:, a vector h and a
rational number γ 2 Q such that hTx  γ but hT y > γ holds for all y 2 K.
For our purposes, we can restrict ourselves to rational polyhedra rather than
general convex sets. In order to describe the necessary background, we need
some denitions.
A rational polyhedron is a subset P  Rn which can be described as
P = P (A; b) := fx 2 Rn j Ax  bg
with a rational matrix A and a rational vector b.
We say that P has facet complexity at most ’ 2 N; if there exists a
system Ax  b of linear inequalities with rational coecients that has P as
its solution set P and has encoding length (i:e:, the number of bits necessary
to represent each individual inequality of the system Ax  b) at most ’.
Example 3.1:
(1) Consider P = core(c)  RN . P can be described via the inequalities
−x(N)  −c(N)
x(S)  c(S) (S  N):
Each of these inequalities has encoding length at most jN j+ hci. Therefore,
P has facet complexity at most ’ = jN j+ hci:
(2) Consider a game (N; c) where P = K(c)\core(c) consists of a unique
point x. By denition, then, there exist sets Sij  N with i 2 Sij; j =2 Sij
such that P = fxg is described by the following system
x(Sij)− x(Sji) = c(Sij)− c(Sji) (i; j 2 N)
x(Sij)− x(S)  c(Sij)− c(S) (S  N; i 2 S; j =2 S)
x(S)  c(S) (S  N)
x(N) = c(N)
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We conclude that P has facet complexity at most ’ = n + 2 < c >.
(Note that adding or subtracting two rational numbers c = p=q and c0 =
p0=q0 of encoding length at most < c > each, results in a rational number
(pq0  p0q)=(qq0) of encoding length at most 2 < c >.)

A separation algorithm for P is an algorithm SEP solving the separation
problem: \Given a vector x 2 Qn, decide whether x 2 P or not, and, in the
latter case, nd a vector a 2 Qn such that aTx < aT y for all y 2 P".
The following results are due to Gro¨tschel, Lovasz and Schrijver (cf:
Schrijver [1986], Theorem 14.1 and Corollary 14.1a):
Theorem 3.1. There exists an algorithm FEAS and a polynomial p in two
variables n;’ such that the following holds:
For each polyhedron P  Rn with facet complexity at most ’ for which
there exists a separation algorithm SEP , FEAS computes, on input n and
’, a vector in P or concludes that P = ; in time bounded by T  p(n;’),
where T is the maximum time required by SEP for inputs x 2 Rn of size
p(n;’).

Corollary 3.1. There exists an algorithm ELL such that ELL solves, on
input (n;’; SEP; d), the optimization problem
maxfdTx jx 2 Pg
in time polynomially bounded by n, ’, the size of d, and T , the maximum
time required by SEP for inputs x 2 Rn of size p(n;’).
To get an idea how the algorithm FEAS of Theorem 3.1 works, recall rst
the standard iteration of the ellipsoid method: Given a polyhedron P  Rn
and an ellipsoid E(i)  P with center x(i), one computes an approximation
~x(i) of x(i) of size < ~x(i) >  p(n;’) and uses SEP in order to decide
whether ~x(i) 2 P (in which case the algorithm stops with output ~x(i)) or
not. In the latter case, SEP computes a separating hyperplane which cuts
o one half of E(i). One then determines an ellipsoid E(i+1) containing
the other half (and, in particular, P ) with center x(i+1) and repeats the
procedure. If P is full-dimensional, this algorithm produces some x(k) 2 P
after polynomially many steps.
The algorithm FEAS of Theorem 3.1 is somewhat more sophisticated so
that it can also deal with lower dimensional polyhedra. If P is contained
in some hyperplane H, it can happen that SEP returns separating hyper-
planes that are parallel (or almost parallel) with H. FEAS will detect
this situation and, using certain approximation techniques, will compute a
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hyperplane containing P . The algorithm then continues within this hyper-
plane as before. Details about FEAS can be found, e:g:, in the book of
Schrijver [1986].
We conclude this section by illustrating the power of Corollary 3.1 and,
assuming (CCM), derive a polynomial algorithm for the computation of an
element in the least core of the game (N; c) 2 C.
Consider the linear program (LC):
max 
s:t x(N) = c(N)
x(S)  c(S)−  for all ; 6= S 6= N
(LC) is clearly feasible. We next claim that the linear program (LC) is
bounded (and hence has an optimal solution, which, by denition, will be
in leastcore(c)). Indeed, adding all the inequalities
xi  c(fig) −  ;
and using x(N) = c(N), we obtain the bound
  1jN j
 X
i2N
c(fig) − c(N)
!
:
Let P denote the polytope of feasible solutions of (LC). From Corol-
lary 3.1, we know that we can solve (LC) in polynomial time if we can solve
the separation problem for P in polynomial time. The latter can be done
as follows. Having checked in polynomial time whether x(N) = c(N) is
satised, we turn to the other restrictions of (LC).
So let (x; ) be given. Invoking (CCM), we either nd out that
emin(x)  
holds and (x; ) is indeed feasible, or we can compute a coalition ; 6= S 6= N
in polynomial time such that
c(S)− x(S) = emin(x) <  :
So y(S) +   c(S) yields the desired separating inequality.
4. Approximating the Prekernel
Suppose x 2 RN is an allocation for which we can nd players i; j 2 N
such that sij(x) < sji(x), say sij(x) = sji(x)− 2;  > 0. We then say that
the allocation x0 dened by
x0k =
8<: xi −  if k = ixj +  if k = j
xk else
arises from x by a transfer from i to j (of size ) (or simply (i; j)-transfer).
If we order the excesses of x and x0 non-decreasingly, one can show that
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x0 will be lexicographically greater than x, i:e:, x0 will be \closer" to the
prenucleolus (c) than x. If no pair of players admits a transfer, then x 2
K(c) holds by denition.
The idea to try to approximate the prekernel by iteratively carrying out
transfers between pairs of players is due to Maschler. But it is not clear
whether an arbitrary sequence of transfers necessarily converges to an allo-
cation in the prekernel. Stearns [1968] proposes a version of such a transfer
scheme for which convergence to the prekernel can be proved. In this sec-
tion, we will take a closer look at the transfer scheme (and provide a short
proof of Stearns’ main result).
We say that the coalition S  N separates the (ordered) pair (i; j) of
players if i 2 S and j 2 N n S. Given the allocation x 2 RN , the coalition
S  N is called (i; j;x)-minimal if S separates (i; j) and
sij(x) = c(S)− x(S) ( = e(S; x) ) :
Lemma 4.1. Let the allocation x0 2 RN arise from x by a transfer from i
to j of size  > 0. Then
(i) skl(x)−   skl(x0)  skl(x) +  for all k; l 2 N .
(ii) sij(x0) = sji(x0) = sij(x) + .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary coalition S  N . Then
x0(S) =
8<: x(S) +  if S (i; j)-separatingx(S)−  if S (j; i)-separating
x(S) otherwise.
Assume now that S is (k; l;x)-minimal. Then
skl(x) = e(S; x) = c(S)−x(S)  c(S)−x0(S)− = e(S; x0)−  skl(x0)− :
The other inequality is proved similarly relative to a (k; l;x0)-minimal co-
alition S0.

Lemma 4.2. Assume that the allocation x0 2 RN arises from the allocation
x 2 RN by an (i; j)-transfer of size  and let (k; l) be a pair of players such
that skl(x) < sij(x). Then
skl(x0) = e(S; x0) = e(S; x) = skl(x)
for every (k; l;x)-minimal coalition S  N .
Proof. Let S  N be (k; l;x)-minimal. Then the hypothesis
e(S; x) = skl(x) < sij(x) < sji(x)
implies in particular that S separates neither (i; j) nor (j; i). Hence we have
x0(S) = x(S), which yields skl(x0)  skl(x).
The proof of skl(x)  skl(x0) is similar.

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For the allocation x 2 RN , let us set
s(x) :=
 1 if x 2 K(c)
minfsij j sij(x) < sji(x)g else.
Hence we have x =2 K(c) if and only if s(x) < 1. Moreover, skl(x) < s(x)
implies skl(x) = slk(x) and, by Lemma 4.2, skl(x0) = skl(x) whenever x0
arises from x by some (i; j)-transfer.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that the allocation x0 arises from the allocation x by
an (i; j)-transfer of size . Then
(i) skl(x0) < skl(x) implies skl(x0)  sij(x0) = sij(x) + .
(ii) s(x0)  s(x) .
Proof. Assume skl(x0) < skl(x) and let S  N be (k; l;x0)-minimal.
Then the assumption implies that S is (j; i)-separating, and we deduce
skl(x0) = e(S; x0)  sji(x0) = sji(x)−  = sij(x) +  ;
which implies (i). (ii) is a direct consequence of (i).

We aim at sequences of transfers that eventually yield a strict increase of
s(x). We therefore restrict our attention to a special type of transfer and
call the (i; j)-transfer is canonical if
sij(x) = s(x) :
Proposition 4.1. Given any allocation x =2 K(c), then one obtains an
allocation x(t) satisfying s(x(t)) > s(x) after t < jN j2 canonical transfers.
Proof. Consider the set I(x) := f(k; l) j skl(x) = s(x)g of pairs of players.
Let x0 be obtained via a canonical (i; j)−transfer of size .
If s(x0) = s(x), then (i; j) =2 I(x0) while no new pair (k; l) enters I(x0).
Indeed, if skl(x) < s(x), then skl(x0) = skl(x) < s(x) by Lemma 4.2. If
skl(x) > sij(x) = s(x), then skl(x0) < skl(x) yields
skl(x0)  sij(x) +  > s(x)
by Lemma 4.3. So s(x0) = s(x) implies jI(x0)j  jI(x)j − 1, i:e:, after at
most jI(x)j < jN j2 canonical transfers the desired allocation will be found.

If the new allocation x(t) from Proposition 4.1 is not in K(c), we could
continue to compute a sequence of transfers which further increases s(x(t))
etc:. Would such a procedure necessarily converge to an element in K(c)?
We do not know, but we suspect that the answer is negative. In order to
ensure convergence to K(c), Stearns [1968] requires the sequence of transfers
to contain an innite number of maximal transfers. Here, a maximal transfer
is, by denition, a transfer from i to j such that
sji(x)− sij(x) = max
k;l
fskl(x)− slk(x)g :
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In order to make our paper selfcontained, we present a short alternative
proof for Stearns’ result. Given an allocation x, we order the surplusses
non-decreasingly:
si1j1(x)  : : :  simjm(x) (m = jN j(jN j − 1) ) :
Dene
(x) :=
mX
r=1
2m−rsirjr(x):
Note that  is well dened (even though the ordering is not unique).
Suppose that x0 arises from x by an (i; j)-transfer. Assume (i; j) = (ip; jp)
and (j; i) = (iq; jq) for some q > p and sji(x)−sij(x) = 2: Let r be maximal
such that sirjr(x)   := sipjp(x) + , i:e:,
si1j1(x)  : : :  sirjr(x)   < sir+1jr+1(x)      : : :  simjm :
From Lemma 4.3, we know that no surplus is decreased below level 
when passing from x to x0 . In particular, the surplusses
si1j1(x); : : : ; sirjr(x)
are not decreased at all and at least one of them is increased by . The
surplusses of value strictly larger than  are decreased by at most  (see
Lemma 4.1). So the new ranking of this surplus that was increased will be
at most r, and the new rankings of the surplusses that were decreased stay
strictly greater than r. This implies
(x0)− (x)  2m−r− 2m−r−1−    − 20 =  :
Lemma 4.4. Assume that x(0); x(1);    is a sequence of allocations such
that each x(t) arises from x(t−1) by an (it; jt)-transfer of size (t). Then
(x(t)) converges to some allocation x 2 RN :
Proof. Let s(t)min := minfsij(x(t))g. Then
(x(0))  2m−1s(0)min +   + 20s(0)min = (2m − 1)s(0)min :
The proof of Proposition 4.1 shows that a transfer never decreases smin,i:e:,
s
(t)
min  s(0)min: Now consider any pair (i; j)and let
cmax := max
SN
jc(S)j :
Choose any subset S with i 2 S; j =2 S. Then we obtain the inequalities
sij(x(t))  c(S) − x(t)(S)
sji(x(t))  c(N n S) − x(t)(N n S):
Since x(t) is an allocation, we conclude
sij(x(t)) + sji(x(t))  c(S) + c(NnS)− c(N)  3cmax :
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Hence sij(x(t))  3cmax − s(0)min and, consequently,
(x(t))  (2m − 1)(3cmax − s(0)min) :
This showsX
t1
(t)  lim
t!1 (x
(t))− (x(0))  (2m − 1)(3cmax − 2s(0)min) <1
and the claim of the Lemma follows.

Theorem 4.1. [Stearns (1968)]
If x(0); x(1); : : : is a sequence of allocations such that each x(t) arises from
x(t−1) by a transfer and if an innite number of these transfers are maximal,
then (x(t)) converges to an element x 2 K(c).
Proof. Suppose that x(t) arises from x(t−1) by a transfer of size (t). If
limx(t) =: x =2 K(c), then there exists a pair (i; j) of players with
sij(x) = sij(x)− 2 ( > 0) :
Choose t0 large enough so thatX
tt0
(t) < =4 :
Then
jjx(t) − xjj1 =
X
i2N
jx(t)i − xi j < =2
for all t  t0. In particular, sij(x(t)) < sji(x(t)) −  holds for all t 
t0, implying that none of the (t)-transfers, t  t0, can be maximal, a
contradiction.

Although we have not been able to derive the analogue of Theorem 4.1
when restricting ourselves to canonical transfers only, it turns out that
canonical transfers can be used in the design of polynomial algorithms for
the computation of allocations in the prekernel. We will discuss such an
algorithm in the next section.
5. Computing an element in K(c)
Let y 2 RN be an allocation with y 2 leastcore(c) but y =2 K(c). If
 = emin(y) = s(y), we perform t = O(jN j2) canonical transfers to obtain
some allocation y(t) with s(y(t)) > s(y) =  (cf: Proposition 4.1). It follows
from Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 that y(t) will also lie in leastcore(c). Hence
there is no loss of generality when we assume from the outset that our
y 2 leastcore(c) satises s(y) > emin(y).
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We now assume y =2 K(c) and consequently order the surplusses of y so
that
si1j1(y)  : : :  sirjr(y) < s(y) = sir+1jr+1(y)  : : :
We call the (non-empty) ordered set of pairs
S(y) = f(i1; j1); : : : ; (ir ; jr)g
a feasible collection of pairs for y. Note that, by denition, the pairs in S(y)
are symmetric in the sense that (i; j) 2 S(y) if and only if (j; i) 2 S(y).
For each pair (i; j) 2 S(y), let Sij be an (i; j; y)-minimal coalition. The
ordered collection
(y) = fSi1j1; : : : ; Sirjrg
is called a feasible collection of sets for y.
It will be convenient to introduce the following notation for all i; j 2 N :
Nij := fS  N jS separates (i; j)g :
Recalling the parameter  = (c) = maxfemin(x) jx allocationg, which
denes the least core of the game (N; c), consider the linear program
LP((y))): max 
s:t:
(5:0) x(N) = c(N)
(5:1) e(Sij ; x) = e(Sji; x) for all (i; j) 2 S(y)
(5:2) e(Sij ; x)  e(S; x) for all (i; j) 2 S(y); S 2 Nij
(5:3) e(Sikjk ; x)  e(Sik+1jk+1; x) for k = 1; : : : ; r − 1
(5:4) e(Sirjr ; x)  e(S; x) −  for all (i; j) =2 S(y); S 2 Nij
(5:5) e(Si1j1; x)  
Note that all inequalities describing the feasible region of LP((y)) have
size polynomially bounded in jN j and < c >, i:e:, the facet complexity of
the feasible region is polynomially bounded (independent of the vector y).
By our assumption on y, LP((y)) is feasible (for example, y itself is a
feasible solution with  = s(y) − sirjr(y) > 0). We claim that LP((y))
is bounded (and hence has an optimal solution (y; ). Indeed, because
y =2 K(c), there exists some i; j 2 N such that (i; j) =2 S(y). Let S be (i; j)-
separating. Then the restrictions (5:4) relative to S and to its complement
N nS imply in view of x(N) = c(N) (condition ( 5.0)) and   e(Sirjr ; x)−
(condition (5.5)):
2  e(S; x)+e(N nS; x)−2  c(S)+c(N nS)+c(N)−2  3cmax−2 :
Hence we conclude that LP((y)) has a nite optimal solution (y; ). If
(y; ) is an optimal solution for LP((y)), then y 2 leastcore(c) (con-
dition (5.5)) and S(y)  S(y) (because  > 0). For our algorithm, the
following property of y is crucial.
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Lemma 5.1. Assume that the allocation y0 arises from y after a sequence
of canonical transfers. Then s(y0) > s(y) implies S(y0)  S(y).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4.2 that each canonical transfer leaves
any surplus of value less than s(y) unchanged. Lemma 4.3 tells us that
a canonical (i; j)-transfer from the allocation z to the allocation z0 yields
s(z0)  s(z). So we conclude S(z0)  S(z).
Hence, if s(z0) > s(z) and S(z0) = S(z) is satised, the canonical transfer
must have raised every surplus skl(z) satisfying skl(z) = s(z). So we observe
s(z0)− sipjp(z0) > s(z)− siplp(z) for all (ip; jp) 2 S(z).
Since y optimizes  in LP((y)), s(y0) > s(y) implies that S(y0) contains
S(y) strictly.

Lemma 5.1 suggests the following algorithm for the computation of an
allocation in the prekernel K(c):
Algorithm PREKER:
(0) (Initialization):
(0.0) Compute an allocation y 2 leastcore(c)
(0.1) Starting with y, perform canonical transfers until an allocation
y0 with s(y0) > s(y) is found;
(1) (Iteration):
(1.0) IF s(y0) =1 THEN output y0 and STOP;
(1.1) Compute an optimal solution y for the linear program LP((y0));
(1.2) Starting with y, perform canonical transfers until an allocation
y0 with s(y0) > s(y) is found;
(1.3) GOTO (1.0);
Because S(y)  S(y0) holds in every iteration, Lemma 5.1, together
with the observation jS(y)j < jN j2, implies that algorithm PREKER will
stop after less than jN j2 iterations and output some y 2 leastcore(c)\K(c).
Moreover, PREKER will be a polynomial algorithm if the initialization and
each iteration can be implemented to run in polynomial time. Assuming
(CCM) or (CCS), we will show that the latter can indeed be achieved.
In Section 3, we have seen that the ellipsoid method allows us to nd an
allocation in the least core in polynomial time. Moreover, Proposition 4.1
shows that steps (0.1) and (1.2) require not more than jN j2 transfers and
hence can be carried out in polynomial time. It suces, therefore, to prove
that the linear program LP((y)) is solvable in polynomial time. As in
the case of least core computations, we recall the polynomial equivalence
of linear optimization and separation and approach the problem via Corol-
lary 3.1: We show that the associated separation problem is polynomially
solvable.
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Let (x0; 0) be given and suppose, for example, that sij(x0) − 0 <
e(Sirjr;; x0) holds for some (i; j) =2 S(y), i:e:, that condition (5.4) is vio-
lated. Then we compute some (i; j;x0)-minimal coalition S  N and obtain
e(S; x) −   e(Sirjr ; x)
as a separating inequality. From Corollary 3.1, we therefore deduce the exis-
tence of a polynomial algorithm that computes the desired feasible solution
(y; ).
We have therefore proved our main result:
Theorem 5.1. Assume that (CCS) or, equivalently, (CCM) holds for the
class C of cooperative games. Then there exists a polynomial algorithm that
computes an allocation x 2 leastcore(c) \K(c) for every game (N; c) 2 C.

6. Convex games
Since we have chosen for the \cost" model of cooperative games, let us
dene \convex" games as those games (N; v) whose characteristic function
c : 2N ! Q is submodular, i:e:,
c(S [ T ) + c(S \ T )  c(S) + c(T ) for all S; T  N :
We assume that the cost function c is given by an oracle which, on input
S  N , outputs c(S) in time Tc = hci.
It is well-known that for convex games the (pre)kernel consists only of a
single point and that the core is nonempty. Hence x = K(c)\ core(c) is the
nucleolus (cf. Maschler et al. [1972]).
The fact that assumption (CCM) holds for this class of games is a standard
result in combinatorial optimization (cf. Gro¨tschel et al. [1993]).
A collection M 2N of subsets of N is called a crossing family if
S; T 2M; S \ T 6= ;; S [ T 6= N ) S \ T 2M; S [ T 2M :
Note that M = 2Nnf;;Ng, for example, is a crossing family.
Given an allocation x 2 RN , it is easy to see that the excess function
e(; x) : M ! Q is also submodular on the crossing family M whenever c
is submodular. Therefore the following holds (cf. Gro¨tschel et al. [1993],
Section 10.3).
(CCM) for submodular games (N; c):
Given a submodular game (N; c) and an allocation x 2 RN , one can
compute
minfe(S; x) j ; 6= S 6= Ng
in time polynomial in jN j and < c >.
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
Thus we obtain the following result of Kuipers [1997] as a special case of
our algorithm PREKER:
Theorem 6.1. If c : 2N ! Q is submodular, the nucleolus (c) can be
computed in time polynomial in jN j and < c >.

7. MCST-games
In this section, we will apply our main result to the class of minimum
cost spanning tree games (MCST-games). This class of games has been
widely studied in the literature. After its introduction by Bird [1976], various
results about the core and nucleolus were established (see, e:g:, Granot and
Huberman [1981, 1984]). Megiddo [1987] and Granot et al. [1996] describe
an O(n3) algorithm for computing the nucleolus in the special case where the
underlying graph is a tree. Galil [1980] subsequently reduced the number of
operations to O(n log n) and Granot and Granot [1992] consider an extended
model in which they compute the nucleolus in strongly polynomial time.
In contrast with the positive results for some special cases, Faigle et
al. [1997] show that the problem of computing the nucleolus for an MCST-
game is NP -hard if there are no restrictions on the underlying graph.
Of interest for us is a result of Granot and Huberman [1984] who show
that the intersection of core and prekernel of an MCST-game consists of
precisely the nucleolus. According to Theorem 5.1, polynomial solvability
of the minimum excess problem for MCST-games would imply that the
nucleolus of an MCST-game could be computed in polynomial time. The
result of Faigle et al. shows that this is very unlikely for the general MCST-
game. However, we will indicate a subclass of MCST-games for which the
minimum excess problem is solvable in polynomial time. For this subclass
we can therefore conclude that the nucleolus is computable in polynomial
time.
First, however, let us rigorously dene what we understand by an MCST-
game. Denote by N = f1; : : : ; ng a set of customers who all need to be
connected to some common supplier denoted by 0. Given is an undirected
connected graph G = (N [ f0g; E), together with a non-negative weight
function w : E ! R+. The weighted graph determines the cost of establish-
ing a link between a pair i; j 2 N [ f0g: it is the minimal weight sum on a
path between i and j in G. The cost c(S) of coalition S  N is dened as
the cost of a minimum spanning tree on S [ f0g. The game (N; c) dened
in this way is called a minimum cost spanning tree game. The graph G is
called the underlying graph of the game.
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The minimal excess problem is closely related to the so-called vertex
weighted Steiner tree problem. Let us give a description of this problem.
Let (V;E) be an undirected graph, let w : E ! R+ be a non-negative
weight function on the edges, and let r : V ! R be a reward function on
the vertices. For any set U  V the cost is dened as
k(U)− r(U) ;
where k(U) is the weight of a minimum spanning tree on U . The vertex
weighted Steiner tree (VWST) problem is the problem of determining a set
U  T of minimal cost, where T  V is a specied non-empty set of so-called
terminal nodes. The problem was rst treated by Segev [1987].
Observe that minimizing c(S)−x(S) for an MCST-game (N; c) and some
input vector x is precisely the VWST problem on the underlying graph with
root 0 as the only terminal node, and reward xi on vertex i 2 N (reward 0 on
node 0). Applying our main Theorem 5.1, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.1. Let G be a class of graphs, C(G) be the class of MCST-games
whose underlying graph is in G, and V(G) the class of VWST problems whose
underlying graph is in G. Then a polynomial algorithm for V(G) implies a
polynomial algorithm for computing the nucleolus for C(G).

The general VWST problem is NP -hard. This is well-known, but may
also be deduced from the fact that it is ‘harder’ than the problem of comput-
ing the nucleolus for a MCST-game, which is already an NP -hard problem
(cf: Faigle et al. [1997b]).
Borie et al. [ 1992], however, introduce a relatively large class of so-called
recursively constructed graphs, for which the VWST-problem (and many
others) can be solved even in linear time. Basically the idea is to construct
graphs from a nite set of base graphs.
Roughly, a recursively constructed graph is then a graph which is either
one of those base graphs or can be obtained by merging (identifying specied
nodes) of a number of already constructed graphs. Well-known examples of
recursively constructed graphs are trees, outer planar graphs, series-parallel
graphs, Halin graphs, bandwidth-k graphs, and partial k−trees (graphs with
treewidth  k for some xed k 2 N). Theorem 7 of Borie et al. [1992]
states that, e:g:, the VWST-problem is linear time solvable for such graphs.
Combining this fact with Corollary 7.1, we conclude that for all those classes
of graphs, the nucleolus of the corresponding MCST-game can be computed
in polynomial time.
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8. Open problems and remarks
Our algorithm has some similarities with the standard prodecure for com-
puting the nucleolus via a sequence of linear programs of decreasing dimen-
sion. We suspect that this standard procedure will, in general, increase the
facet complexity in each step. In particular, we surmise that the size of the
nucleolus is not polynomially bounded in general. This is the reason why we
work with the concept of \feasible collections" of sets in our linear programs
LP((y)).
The complexity result we have derived is a theoretical one and gives little
insight in how an element in leastcore(c) \ K(c) should best be calculated
in practice. In Kuipers et al. [1996], an O(n3jEj) algorithm is described for
computing the prenucleolus of games whose collection of ‘essential’ coalitions
E possess a certain combinatorial structure. The class of MCST-games is
one of the examples to which the algorithm can be applied. Interesting here
is the structure of this algorithm: it nds the prenucleolus by computing
O(n2) ‘approximations’ of the nucleolus. The computation of one such ap-
proximation vector requires the solution of O(n) minimum excess problems.
The minimum excess problems do not correspond directly to the game
for which the prenucleolus is computed, since this game is adapted during
the computations, and the minimum excess problem has to be solved with
respect to the adapted game. However, a close examination of the way
the original game is adapted shows that one can solve the minimum excess
problem for the adapted game by solving the problem for the original game
plus an extra amount of work that is linear in the number of players. For
an MCST-game this means that its nucleolus can be computed in O(n3m)
time if the underlying graph is a recursively constructible graph, where n
and m denote the number of vertices and edges in the graph. In view of our
results, it would be interesting to look for other classes of games for which
core(c) \ K(c) is a singleton.
Finally, it would be interesting to know whether our intuitive reasoning
that (CCS) is the \minimal" assumption we need for computing an element
in the prekernel K eciently can be made hard in the sense that one can
prove that an ecient algorithm for the computation of an element in K
implies (CCS).
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